TAKE-AWAY

View as suspicious any line of questioning concerning military or intelligence-based contracts or dual-use technology, unless topics were previously approved.

Even if an appropriate authority grants a foreign visitor access to classified U.S. information, that visitor is not entitled to classified information unless he/she has cleared need-to-know that has been communicated and verified in advance of the visit.

Inform your Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) Industrial Security Representative or DCSA CI Special Agent of proposed foreign visitors. Given adequate time, they can assist with identifying risks to the cleared company, its technology, and its personnel.

View as suspicious any attendee's effort to contact you before, during, or after the visit by phone, email, or social media.

If any suspicious incidents occur during the visit, report them to your facility security officer immediately.

REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) 32 Part 117, National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (NISPOM) requires the reporting of suspicious contacts, behaviors, and activities.

If you suspect you or your company has been targeted, report it immediately. Recognizing and reporting indicators is critical to disrupting CI threats and mitigating risks. Reporting allows us to share and address risks together.

DCSA
https://www.dcsa.mil

DCSA, Counterintelligence Directorate
https://www.dcsa.mil/mc/ci

Center for Development of Security Excellence
https://www.cdse.edu

PREPARING FOR FOREIGN VISITORS

BE ALERT! BE AWARE!

Report suspicious activities to your facility security officer

DEFENSE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY AGENCY

PREPARING FOR FOREIGN VISITORS

Foreign visitors are common in today's global economy and are often a welcome opportunity to boost business. However, cleared contractors should be aware that there are potential counterintelligence (CI) vulnerabilities and threats.

While most visitors are here for legitimate purposes, the sheer volume of visitors makes it difficult to detect those with ulterior motives.

Foreign delegation visits to cleared contractor facilities are one of the most frequently used methods to target and attempt to gain access to controlled unclassified information (CUI) from cleared industry.

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

It is cheaper for foreign entities to illicitly obtain CUI or classified information and technology than to fund the initial research and development (R&D) themselves. The U.S. Government spends more on R&D than any other country in the world, making U.S. contractors performing R&D prime targets for foreign collection of both classified and unclassified commercial technology.

When a foreign visit occurs at your facility, preparation and awareness are essential to preventing loss of information. Stay alert and watch for indicators to help assess the potential for visitor targeting or collection.



TECHNIQUES VISITORS USE TO ELICIT INFORMATION

- **Peppering:** Visitors ask a variation of the same question or one visitor asks the same question to multiple U.S. contractor employees.
- **Wandering Visitor:** The visitor uses the distraction provided by a large delegation to slip away, out of the escort's control. Once away from the escort, the visitor may try to access a restricted area, sensitive or classified documents, or unattended and unlocked information systems.
- **Divide and Conquer:** Visitors corner an escort away from the group and attempt to discuss unapproved topics to remove the escort's safety net of assistance in answering questions.
- **Switch Visitors:** Delegations may add a new visitor to the group at the last minute, leaving little or no time for the company to vet the new visitor against known intelligence officers.
- **Bait and Switch:** The visitors plan to discuss one business topic, but after arriving, they attempt to discuss the cleared contractor's other projects, often dealing with CUI or classified information.
- **Distraught Visitor:** When the visitor's questions are not answered, he/she acts insulted or creates an uncomfortable scene to psychologically coerce information from the target.
- **Use of Prohibited Electronics:** The visitors bring unauthorized electronic devices such as cell phones, cameras, or thumb drives into restricted space.

PREPARING YOUR FACILITY FOR FOREIGN VISITORS*

- Prior to the visit, brief all escorts and personnel working with the delegation on what they can and cannot discuss.
- Develop standard, acceptable responses to questions that may arise, especially if the projects are CUI or classified, are not applicable to the country visit, or include proprietary information.
- If the delegation attempts to make additional contacts with escorts and speakers, ensure they limit discussions to the agreed-upon topics and information.
- Conduct a pre-visit facility walkthrough to ensure visitors cannot hear or see CUI, export-controlled information, or classified information during all areas of their visit.
- Train escorts to detect suspicious behavior and questions, ensure they know to maintain visual contact with all visitors at all times, and develop contingency plans to handle visitors who leave the group.
- After the visit, debrief the host and all escorts to uncover if visitors exhibited any strange and/or suspicious activities, or asked unusual and probing questions.

**For additional information, see Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) 32 Part 117 National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (NISPOM).*

LONG-TERM VISITS AND JOINT VENTURES

Long-term visits or joint ventures may provide an opportunity for a foreign long-term visitor to obtain restricted/proprietary information.

They also provide an opportunity for visitors to spot, assess, and befriend employees that may assist, wittingly or unwittingly, in collecting restricted/proprietary information.