



Counterintelligence (CI)

The National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual defines suspicious contacts as:

Efforts by any individual, regardless of nationality, to obtain illegal or unauthorized access to classified information or to compromise a cleared employee.

Contacts by cleared employees with known or suspected intelligence officers from any country, or any contact which suggests a cleared employee may be the target of an attempted exploitation by the intelligence services of another country.
(Paragraph r-302b of DoD 5220.22-M)

IDENTIFYING SUSPICIOUS CONTACTS

Examples of [suspicious contacts](#)* include, but are not limited to:

Efforts by any individuals regardless of nationality, to obtain illegal or unauthorized [access to classified information](#) or to compromise a cleared employee.

Contact by cleared employees with known or suspected [intelligence officers](#) from any foreign country.

Any contact that suggests the employee concerned may be [the target of an attempted exploitation](#) by a foreign intelligence entity.

Attempts to entice cleared employees into compromising situations that could lead to [blackmail or extortion](#).

Attempts by foreign customers to gain access to [hardware and information](#) that exceeds the limitations of the export licenses on file.

Attempts to place cleared personnel under obligation through special treatment, [favors, gifts, or money](#).

[Requests for protected information](#) in the guise of a price quote or purchase request, market survey, or other pretense.